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Posts 697–720 of 928, newest first.
Per-Tenant Search Indexing in Isolated microVMs
Multi-tenant search is a noisy-neighbor and data-leak minefield — one tenant's reindex starves everyone's queries, and a shared index is a leak waiting to happen. Give each tenant its own microVM.
Ajay KumarSandboxing an untrusted Java/Maven (and Gradle) build
build.gradle is a Turing-complete program you're asking to run as you. A poisoned pom.xml or build script can drop a coinminer or read your secrets at build time. Here's how to make that safe.
Firecracker vs AWS Fargate: Control and Latency
Here's the twist most comparisons miss: AWS Fargate already runs on Firecracker. Both are microVM-isolated. The real difference is control, startup latency, and whether you get a per-request sandbox API — not the isolation model.
Ajay KumarFirecracker vs the Nix build sandbox: different jobs
"Firecracker vs the Nix sandbox" is a category mix-up worth untangling: Nix's sandbox makes builds pure and reproducible; Firecracker makes untrusted code hardware-isolated. They solve different problems — and for untrusted reproducible builds you want both.
Ajay KumarHow Firecracker uses the Linux KVM API: an internals explainer
Firecracker is a userspace program driving a handful of ioctls against /dev/kvm. Here's the actual interface — KVM_CREATE_VM, memory regions, the per-vCPU KVM_RUN loop, and why that tiny exit-handling surface is the security story.
Ajay KumarDesigning a Guest-Agent Control Protocol Over vsock
You have a microVM full of untrusted code and a tiny init process inside it. How does the host tell that process to run a command, read a file, or report readiness — without ever giving the guest a network? You design a small RPC over vsock. Here's the framing, the streaming, the restore semantics, and the security posture.
Ajay KumarBest Sandboxes for Running MCP Servers (2026)
An MCP server is a stranger's code you invited to sit next to your API keys. The honest best-of for isolating them: microVMs (PandaStack, E2B, Vercel Sandbox), gVisor (Modal), Kata, plain containers, and WASM — judged by what matters for MCP.
Ajay KumarMemory Oversubscription in MicroVM Fleets, Explained
Oversubscription is airline overbooking for RAM: profitable until everyone shows up. Here's the mechanic that lets a host carry guests whose configured RAM sums past physical — lazy paging, copy-on-write, the balloon, swap — and how to bound the bet before the OOM killer does it for you.
Ajay KumarHow to Sandbox AI Agents in 2026
Your agent is a loop that asks a model what to do and then does it — and 'does it' means running code the model wrote. This is the 2026 how-to for putting a real boundary around that: the threat model, the isolation ladder, and a concrete per-run microVM architecture you can copy.
Ajay KumarTop 5 AI Agent Hosting Platforms in 2026
Hosting an agent is not hosting a web app. It's long-running, bursty, stateful, and it executes untrusted code. Here's a 2026 shortlist of where to actually run agents in production — judged by execution model, isolation, state, and idle economics.
Ajay KumarTop 5 AI Agent Sandbox Platforms in 2026
You've decided your agent needs a sandbox — now which one? A ranked 2026 shortlist of the five agent sandbox platforms worth evaluating, with the criteria that separate them and an honest best-fit for each, plus a decision tree to skip the analysis paralysis.
Ajay KumarPer-Tenant LLM Fine-Tuning Jobs in Isolated microVMs
You let customers upload their own training data and run fine-tuning jobs. That job holds a private dataset, a customer-supplied training script, and a credential. Run each one in its own Firecracker microVM so a poisoned script can't read another tenant's data or walk off with your keys.
Ajay KumarSandboxing PDF & Document Processing for AI Agents
A PDF is a Turing-complete document format that would very much like to talk to your kernel. When your AI agent ingests user-uploaded documents, it's feeding attacker-controlled bytes into parsers with a long CVE history. Parse each one in a disposable microVM.
Ajay KumarPer-Tenant Scheduled Report Generation in microVMs
Your nightly cron generates reports for every customer — running their SQL against their data, rendering their templates, and shipping the result. Each run holds a tenant's DB credential and executes something you didn't write. Give each run its own microVM.
Ajay KumarFirecracker vs crun vs youki: a VMM vs OCI runtimes
"Firecracker vs crun vs youki" compares a hypervisor to two OCI container runtimes — a category mismatch worth explaining. crun (C) and youki (Rust) make faster, safer runc-equivalents, but they don't change the isolation boundary: your one shared host kernel.
Ajay KumarThe Firecracker VMGenID Device, Explained
Two VMs, one entropy pool, zero good outcomes. When you restore or fork a snapshot, the guest wakes up sure it's the same running system with the same RNG state. The VM Generation ID device is how it finds out it was forked — and reseeds before it hands out a duplicate nonce.
Ajay KumarFirecracker Networking: TAP vs macvtap (and netns)
A shared bridge is a group chat your tenants didn't ask to join. Firecracker hands its guest NIC to a host TAP device — but how you wire that TAP up (a shared bridge, a per-VM network namespace, or macvtap) decides whether you built isolation or just plumbing.
Ajay KumarBest gVisor Alternatives in 2026
gVisor is a kernel cosplaying as your kernel so the real one doesn't get hurt. It's clever, and it isn't the only way to sandbox untrusted code. Here's an honest 2026 map of the alternatives — hardware microVMs, WASM, hardened containers — sorted by what you're actually defending against.
Ajay KumarBuilding untrusted Rust code in a microVM
build.rs is just cargo asking 'may I run some code?' and answering itself yes. Proc-macros run inside the compiler. So cargo build on an untrusted crate is remote code execution before a single line of your program runs. Here's how to contain it in a microVM.
A Zero-Trust Architecture for Executing Untrusted Code
Zero-trust means you don't trust the code, and you REALLY don't trust the code an LLM wrote at 2am. Here's how the standard zero-trust principles — assume breach, least privilege, microsegmentation, short-lived creds — map onto concrete controls for running untrusted code.
Ajay KumarCPU Pinning and Noisy Neighbors in microVM Fleets
Overcommit is a promise you make to every tenant that they'll all be your favorite; the CFS scheduler is where that promise goes to get audited. A Firecracker vCPU is just a host thread — so one spinning guest can inflate everyone's p99. Here's how to manage it without killing your density.
Ajay KumarPer-Tenant Object Storage Isolation with microVMs
A compromised tenant transform shouldn't be able to read another tenant's bucket or exfiltrate your storage keys. Give each tenant job its own Firecracker microVM, inject short-lived credentials per run, and destroy them with the VM.
Ajay KumarAI Agents That Fill Web Forms (RPA) in a MicroVM
An AI agent filling forms on sites you don't control runs model-generated clicks against hostile DOMs while holding the login. One disposable microVM per session keeps a bad page from poisoning every other run.
Ajay KumarIsolating an AI Slack Bot's Tool Execution in MicroVMs
Every message to your AI bot is untrusted input that can steer the agent into running arbitrary commands. Spin a fresh microVM per Slack command, run the agent's code there, and let it die after the reply.
Ajay Kumar